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Friday, March 30, 2012

[KollelH blog] FUCHS BRIS

IT IS WITH GRATITUDE TO HASHEM THAT WE ARE PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT THE BRIS OF OUR SON WILL IY"H TAKE PLACE SUNDAY MORNING IN THE AGUDA OF AVE L DAVENING AT 8:00 AM

MAY WE SHARE IN SIMCHAS

RAFI AND LEORA FUCHS



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/30/2012 04:57:00 PM

Thursday, March 29, 2012

[KollelH blog] shalom zachor

IT IS WITH GRATITUDE TO HASHEM THAT WE ARE PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT WE ARE IY"H MAKING A SHALOM ZACHOR IN HONOR OF OUR NEWEST ADDITION THIS FRIDAY NIGHT 9:30-11:00 PM IN OUR HOME 1256 E 31 ST

MAY WE SHARE IN SIMCHAS

RAFI AND LEORA FUCHS



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/29/2012 10:49:00 PM

[KollelH blog] Shabbos Hagadol and koshering utensils

Koshering An Earthenware Utensil

In this week's parshah the Torah teaches many of the halachos of the korbanos. Each of the korbanos has a limited amount of time when they may be eaten, after which they become nosar and forbidden. When a utensil is used to cook the flavor, the food is absorbed into the walls of the utensil. Therefore if a forbidden food was cooked, it is prohibited to use the utensil again until it is koshered, since the flavor of the forbidden food will mix into the next food. Amid the halachos of the korban chatas, the Torah writes that since the flavor of the korban will become nosar after its allotted time, any earthenware utensil that was used to cook part of the korban must thereafter be broken. If it was cooked in a metallic utensil, the utensil must be purged and then rinsed in water in order to remove the flavor that was absorbed.

This halacha applies to all of the korbanos. However, the Rambam and Ra'avad disagree regarding the halacha of an earthenware utensil. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh Korbanos 8:14) says that any utensil that was used to cook any korban must be purged and rinsed, whether it is a metallic or earthenware utensil. (The exception is a korban chatas, whereby an earthenware utensil must be broken and may not be purged.) The Ra'avad argues that earthenware utensils may never be purged and must always be broken, regardless of which korban was cooked in it.

The Rambam holds that purging earthenware utensils effectively koshers the utensil; but, specifically by a korban chatas, the Torah commands that an earthenware utensil must be broken and not purged. The Ra'avad disagrees and posits that purging is ineffective and is unable to remove the flavor from earthenware utensils.

The question that arises about the Rambam is that the Gemara in Pesachim 30b says that the Torah testifies that it is impossible to completely remove the forbidden flavor from the walls of an earthenware utensil; hence it must be broken. However, according to the Rambam, purging an earthenware utensil indeed removes the flavor, and only when a korban chatas was cooked in the utensil does the Torah command that the utensil must be broken.

The sefer, Harirai Kedem, suggests that according to the Rambam, when an earthenware utensil is purged not all of the flavor is removed; rather a ta'am kalush (weak flavor) in fact remains. If there would be no flavor remaining, there would be no mitzvah to break the utensil that a korban chatas was cooked in – since there is no remnant of the chatas's flavor. The reason that the Rambam says that one may purge an earthenware utensil that other korbanos were cooked in is because purging removes all of the flavor except for a weak flavor. Since the purging is done before the allotted time that the korban may be eaten, the flavor has not yet become forbidden. Whenever only a weak flavor remains, the utensil is permitted to be used again, provided that at the time of absorption it was not a forbidden flavor (this is known as heteira bala). Only a utensil with a strong flavor is forbidden to be used with another food. The Gemara that says that the flavor never leaves the walls of an earthenware utensil means that a weak flavor will always remain, which if at the time of absorption was a forbidden flavor will prohibit the use of the utensil.  But since a weak flavor remains, there is still room for the Torah to command that regarding a korban chatas, the utensil be broken.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger mentions this idea – that whenever the flavor that was absorbed was not forbidden one should be permitted to purge an earthenware utensil. However, he asks the following question: according to many opinions chametz before Pesach is considered heteira bala because when it was absorbed it was not forbidden. Why then do we paskin that earthenware utensils before Pesach must be broken and may not be purged?

Other Achronim ask another question. The Rambam (Hilchos Chametz U'matzah 5:23) says that metallic or stoneware utensils that cooked chametz (in order to use them on Pesach) must be purged and afterward rinsed in cold water. The Maggid Mishnah and the Hagaos Maimonios explain that the source for this halacha (that the utensil must thereafter be rinsed in cold water) is derived from the halacha of korbanos. However, in Hilchos Machalos Asuros 17:4 – regarding the halachos on koshering utensils that cooked forbidden foods – the Rambam does not mention that the utensil must be rinsed after it is purged. Why the discrepancy?

The sefer, Harirai Kedem, suggests that in order to use a utensil on Pesach one needs to do more than is normally required, in order to use a utensil that was used to cook a forbidden food. Namely, the utensil must lose its identity as a utensil of chametz. Regarding other forbidden foods that were cooked in a metallic utensil, they are permitted to be used again once they are purged. But a utensil that was used to cook chametz is compared to that of korbanos that requires more than just removing the flavor. It also needs to not be identified as a utensil that cooked that item. This second requirement is met when one rinses after purging the utensil; this is derived from the pasuk that requires the purging and rinsing of a utensil that was used in the cooking of a korban.

Earthenware utensils as mentioned above always retain a weak flavor, even after they are purged. Therefore, even the opinions that consider chametz to be heteira bala (which as mentioned earlier when a permitted flavor is absorbed purging will permit the use of the utensil since only a weak flavor will remain) agree that they may not be used on Pesach. Since they retain a weak flavor, they also retain their identity as chametz utensils – and therefore are forbidden to use on Pesach.
The Elyahu Raba in siman 428 quotes the Abudraham that explains that the reason that Shabbos Hagadol generally falls out on parshas Tzav is because we learn many of the halachos of koshering utensils from this parsha.

Note: One should consult an Orthodox rabbi concerning actual practices.

                For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/29/2012 10:46:00 PM

Thursday, March 22, 2012

[KollelH blog] Vayikra

Geneivah And Gezeilah

 

            At the conclusion of this week's parshah, the Torah discusses the halachos of one who stole from another. The pasuk says, "veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal – and he shall return the stolen object that he stole." We derive from this that there is a mitzvas assei to return a stolen object.

            Many Achronim explain that when one steals an item he would actually acquire the item, if not for the fact that the Torah commanded him to return it. It is for this reason that once the item is not returnable (e.g. it is damaged), it then belongs to the one who stole it – who then must reimburse the original owner. Since there is no obligation to return the object, it now belongs to the one who stole it.

The Torah sorts stealing into two categories, each one a separate lo sa'aseh: geneivah and gezeilah. The latter is when one uses force to steal, or steals in the open (without hiding). When one steals covertly, it is referred to as geneivah. There are several differences between the two. One example of how they differ is that only a ganav pays keifel (double), or four or five times the principle amount if he shechts or sells the stolen item. A gazlan does not incur these penalties. However, regarding repaying the principle amount that was stolen, they are similar. Further, the halacha of veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal applies to both geneivah and gezeilah. Therefore a ganav does not acquire the stolen item, just like a gazlan, because they are both obligated to return the item that was stolen.

The Rambam begins discussing hilchos gezeilah with the following halacha: one who steals from another transgressed a lo sa'aseh – as it says, "lo sigzol." However, lashes are not administered to one who transgresses this lo sa'aseh, for the Torah has commanded an assei to rectify it by returning the object that he stole. This is because it says veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal, which is a mitzvas assei. (This concept is known as a lav hanitak l'assei, a positive commandment that rectifies the negative commandment whereby lashes are not administered.) And even if he will destroy the stolen object (making it impossible to fulfill the positive commandment), he nevertheless does not receive lashes; instead he is obligated to pay for the object, the ruling being that any lo sa'aseh that requires one to pay precludes him from receiving lashes.

The Rambam writes at the beginning of hilchos geneivah that lashes are not administered to one who transgresses the lo sa'aseh of geneivah, similar to that of gezeilah. But he writes that this is for a different reason, namely that one who commits geneivah transgresses a lo sa'aseh – as it says, "lo signovo." However, he does not receive lashes for transgressing this lo sa'aseh because the Torah commanded him to pay (and as mentioned above, any lav that requires one to pay precludes the person from receiving lashes). The Rambam does not say that one who transgresses geneivah does not receive lashes, because it is a lav hanitak l'assei.

Many Achronim ask why the Rambam did not write that the reason that a ganav is exempt from lashes is because it is a lav hanitak l'assei, as he did by gezeilah – as since we apply the halacha of veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal to a ganav, it should be a lav hanitak l'assei. And if we would suggest that the Rambam does not apply the halacha of veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal to geneivah, how would we then explain why a ganav does not acquire the item when he steals it.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, zt"l, suggests that indeed the halacha of veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal applies to geneivah. However, we do not apply the actual mitzvah rather we only apply its monetary aspect, i.e. that he must return the stolen object. Therefore one cannot be exempt from lashes as a result of the rule of lav hanitak l'assei, since it is not a mitzvas assei (but only a monetary obligation) to return the item. At the same time, though, the ganav cannot acquire the item when he steals it since he does in fact have a monetary obligation to return the item.

The Imrei Baruch (Choshen Mishpat 34) says that although we indeed apply the halacha of veheishiv es hagezeilah asher gazal to a ganav, even to the extent that there is a mitzvah by a ganav to return the stolen item, it is only due to the Torah's actual writing that it is a mitzvas assei that we can apply the rule of lav hanitak l'assei, exempting one from lashes. Thus, even though the mitzvah also applies to a ganav, the rule of lav hanitak l'assei is not the reason that he is exempt from lashes. And a ganav does not acquire the stolen item when he steals it since he actually does have a mitzvas assei to return the item.

                For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/22/2012 11:41:00 PM

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Parshas Parah and Shame

The Mechaber in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 685.7) brings the opinion of those that say reading Parshas Parah is required by Torah law. This is challenged from a number of different angles and most Poskim agree that it is a Rabbinic law and not D'oraisah. One of the possible sources for this being mid'oraisah, is the passuk in parshas eikev (9:7) זכור אל תשכח את אשר הקצפת את ה' א' במדבר - Remember, don't forget that you have angered Hashem in the desert. This passuk actually requires us to remember the transgression of the עגל - the golden calf, and since the parah adumah serves as a kapparah for the עגל, we read parshas parah. Right. We couldn't find a better portion to read in order to conjure up the memory of the cheit ha'eigel? The story itself is described in vivid detail, both in parshas ki sisah, and also in parshas eikev, following the commandment to remember it! The often quoted medrash that informs us of the relationship between parah and the eigel tells a mashal of a King whose maid servant's son dirtied the King's palace. The mother of the boy was to come and clean up the mess that he had made. So too the "mother" (being an adult female cow) of the golden calf should come and serve as its atonement. The reference the medrash makes to the sin of the eigel as being a dirty mess, is quite a rare analogy for sin. Another point to note, is the absence of the boy himself, in his atonement for sin! Wouldn't it be more appropriate for the boy to show up and clean the palace? We should offer a young calf, similar to the eigel, as the kapparah for our sin! I believe we can answer all of the above with a gemarah in Brachos (12b). Rabbah bar Chinina sabba said in the name of Rav, "One who sins and is ashamed of it, is atoned for all of his sin(s)". The extant of shame needed is clarified in the source the statement. Shaul Hamelech, told the risen soul of Shmuel, that he was not getting direction from G-D through the prophets, nor from visionary dreams. He did not mention the lack of guidance from the Urim V'tumim because he was ashamed to mention the Kohein's garment since he had killed out Nov - a city of Kohanim. This shame granted Shaul atonement for his sins. The mashal given by the medrash is a perfect analogy not only to the sin that took place, but more accurately to the disgrace of what took place! How brazen would the boy have to be, to come back to the palace and face the mess he made! The fact that his mother is needed to come and clean, instead of himself, is a healthy sign of the boy's tremendous feeling of shameful guilt. Perhaps this is the reason why the commandment requiring us to remember the eigel is pretty vague about what to remember. Though we are commanded to remember 'that we angered Hashem in the desert', by no means are we required to explicitly speak out the horrific details in public! On the contrary, our shame to mention it in such a manner, is in itself an atonement for the sin! This crystallizes the gemarah in megillah (25b) which presents the possibility of never publicly reading and translating the story of the eigel, even in the course of the general krias haTorah, due to the disgrace we would feel upon its reading. The gemarah responds that we'd prefer its reading, since the shame adds to our atonement. We may say this is true when the story is read as a manner of course and part of the regular reading , so it does not stand out as openly. However the notion to read the story as its own kriah, is not only preposterous, but also wrong and inappropriate. On the contrary, our shame to read so openly about it, and instead read the parshas parah adumah, which just hints to it, is a positive trait and offers us the true atonement we look forward to. P.S. It is certainly clear from the gemarah in megillah mentioned above, that krias haTorah should be an involving experience, evoking emotions and feelings. Let's hope.

Thursday, March 15, 2012

[KollelH blog] vaykel

May Beis Din Punish On Shabbos?

The Yerushalmi, in Sanhedrin 4:6, derives from the pasuk in the beginning of this week's parshah, "lo seva'aru eish b'chol moshvoseichem b'yom HaShabbos - and you shall not ignite a fire in any of your dwellings on Shabbos," that Beis Din is prohibited from judging on Shabbos. The Rambam, in Hilchos Shabbos 24:7, rules that Beis Din may not carry out the punishment of either death or lashes on Shabbos. He cites the same pasuk of "lo seva'aru" as the source for this halacha. In his Sefer Hamitzvos the Rambam lists as a separate negative commandment (number 322) that Beis Din may not judge or carry out a punishment on Shabbos.

The simple understanding of this halacha is that even though it is a mitzvah to kill someone who is chayav misah (deserving death) on Shabbos, it is forbidden. Despite being a mitzvah it may not be performed on Shabbos, when killing is prohibited, since the Torah says that the Shabbos should not be desecrated for this purpose. However, the Minchas Chinuch asks why the Rambam lists this as a separate mitzvah, when in fact it is the regular prohibition of not killing on Shabbos. This implies that the prohibition to judge and carry out punishments is a new prohibition, separate from the prohibition to kill on Shabbos.

The Magen Avraham, in Orach Chaim 339:3, discusses this matter and proves that there is a new prohibition to judge and exact punishment on Shabbos. He cites the abovementioned Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos and points out that the Rambam includes in the prohibition that Beis Din may not administer lashes on Shabbos. The Magen Avraham says that there is no prohibition of giving someone lashes on Shabbos, but rather that this is forbidden because there is a new prohibition not to judge and punish on Shabbos. He concludes that this is not a clear proof since often, when Beis Din administers lashes bloody wounds are created – which is forbidden on Shabbos.

The Rashba, in Teshuvos 1:357, holds that Beis din may appoint a non-Jew to carry out their verdicts. This is because the one who carries out the punishment does not have to be a real shaliach of Beis Din; rather it merely must be done on their behalf. Reb Elchanon Wasserman, zt"l, Hy"d, in Kovetz Haurus 76:18, explains that Beis Din does not have to carry out the actual punishment; instead they must arrange for it to be executed, and therefore they may appoint someone who is not generally suitable for shalichus. Alternatively the Rashba can be explained, based on the ruling of the Nesivos Hamishpat (Choshen Mishpat 182:1) that says that a non-Jew is fit for shalichus when all that is required is an action. A non-Jew is only unfit for shalichus of a transaction. Therefore Beis Din may appoint a non-Jew to execute their punishments.

Several Achronim ask the following question concerning the ruling of the Rashba: The Gemara, in Yevamos 6b, implies that there is never a situation whereby Beis Din may execute the death penalty on Shabbos. Since Beis Din may appoint a non-Jew to carry out their punishments, why then can they not punish on Shabbos by appointing a non-Jew to kill? However, if we say that there is a separate prohibition to judge and punish on Shabbos, aside from the actual killing, then Beis Din would be prohibited to do so – even if they were to appoint a non-Jew to carry out their verdict.

The Mishnah in Sanhedrin 73a says that if one is chasing after another in an attempt to kill him, everyone must prevent the attempted murder by any means – even by taking the life of the attempted murderer. The Mishnah says that this halacha also applies when one is chasing after one of the arayos. If one is chasing another man on Shabbos, there is no doubt that the halacha applies and that he may be killed since it is a matter of pikuach nefesh. However the Mishneh L'melech says that he is unsure whether the halacha applies to one who is chasing after one of the arayos, since it is not a matter of pikuach nefesh. The reason that he says that perhaps one would not be allowed to kill someone who is chasing one of the arayos is because it is a punishment that cannot be administered on Shabbos.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/15/2012 11:54:00 PM

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

[KollelH blog] purim

Why Do We Read The Megillah?

On Purim we read Megillas Esther twice, once by night and once by day. It is uncertain what the nature of the obligation is. Did the rabbanan obligate us to read the megillah as a part of Kesuvim, similar to the obligation of reading the other megillos (such as Eichah and Shir HaShirim) and similar to the reading of the Torah? Or is the obligation to read only for the purpose of publicizing the miracle (pirsumei nisa)?

It says in Maseches Sofrim 14:3 that prior to reading Megillos Rus, Eichah, Shir HaShirim and Esther one must recite the berachah of "…al mikra megillah." The fact that the Mesechta Sofrim combined all of the megillos into one halacha implies that the obligation to read each of them is the same – namely to read Kesuvim.

            The Yerushalmi in Megillah 3:4 says that the reason we are not allowed to read Megillas Esther on Shabbos (when Purim falls out on Shabbos) is because it is forbidden to read Kesuvim on Shabbos. If the obligation to read Megillas Esther were merely for the mitzvah of publicizing the miracle, it would not be considered as if we are reading Kesuvim – and would therefore be permitted on Shabbos. The fact that the Yerushalmi prohibits the reading of Megillas Esther on Purim, when it falls out on Shabbos, clearly indicates that the obligation is to read Kesuvim.

Based on this, the Sefer Harirai Kedem suggests that we can answer the following question: The Gemara in Shabbos 23a and Sukkah 46a ask how we can say "vetzivanu – and He [Hashem] commanded us" in the berachah that we recite on lighting the menorah on Chanukah, for it is only a mitzvah mi'derabbanan. The Gemara answers that if one does not adhere to the command of the rabbanan, it is a transgression of the pasuk in the Torah of "lo sasur." Therefore one can say that the Torah commanded him to perform this mitzvah. The question is raised: Why does the Gemara not have the same discussion regarding the mitzvah of reading Megillas Esther, which is also a mitzvah mi'derabbanan – but at which time vetzivanu is recited?

If we understand that the berachah of "…vetzivanu al mikra megillah" is a berachah that one recites when reading any megillah that is part of Kesuvim and not for the mitzvah, we can understand why the Gemara does not inquire as to how we can say vetzivanu prior to reading Megillas Esther. Since the berachah is recited even when there is no obligation to read it, the Gemara understood that the berachah is not recited because the rabbanan commanded us to read it, but rather because reading a megillah requires that this berachah be recited.

The Brisker Rav asked the following question: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 690:3) rules, based on the Gemara in Megillah 18b, that one must read the entire megillah while looking inside the megillah. If the sofer skipped several words (up to half the megillah) the reader may recite those words by heart. (The Ramah says that this only applies if an entire inyan (topic) was not skipped. Reb Moshe Soloveitchik said that today we are not certain what an entire inyan is, and therefore we cannot rely on this halacha.) Reading Kesuvim must be read while directly looking at the words – just like krias HaTorah. How then can the obligation to read the megillah be to read Kesuvim, if one can read the megillah by heart? Rather, from this halacha, it seems that the obligation is to publicize the miracle.

The Sefer Harirai Kedem explains that the reason one may read part of the megillah by heart is because we apply the rule of rubo kikulo – the majority is considered as if it is the whole megillah. Since the majority of the megillah is written, when one reads the remaining part by heart it is considered as if he read the entire megillah directly from the megillah. The reason we do not apply this rule to krias HaTorah is because the rule can only be applied when the subject matter is a complete item but lacking a part of it. However, if the matter of discussion is not a complete item, even when it is in its entirety, we cannot apply the rule. As Megillas Esther is a complete item, we can apply the rule. But when one must read a certain amount of p'sukim in the Torah, those p'sukim do not combine to create a complete entity on their own. Rather they are only a part of the complete Torah, and therefore the rule is not applied.

If, though, there was a halacha to read the entire Torah at once, we would apply the rule and it would suffice to only read the majority directly from the Torah. Similarly we do not apply the rule when one must eat a specific amount of matzah (a k'zayis) and say that it suffices to eat the majority of the matzah since a k'zayis is not a complete item but rather an amount. As a result, we can suggest that the obligation to read the megillah is to read Kesuvim.

From the Gemara in Megillah 18a it is evident that there is also an aspect of publicizing the miracle associated with reading the megillah. We can now suggest that there are two aspects regarding the megillah reading: reading Kesuvim and publicizing the miracle. Perhaps this is the reason that we recite two berachos prior to reading the megillah, "…al mikra megillah" and "…she'asah nisim…" – the first for the obligation of reading Kesuvim, the second for publicizing the miracle.

                For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/07/2012 01:15:00 AM

Thursday, March 1, 2012

[KollelH blog] Zachor

Are Women Obligated To Hear Parshas Zachor?

This week we read parshas zachor. There is a mitzvas assay for one to remember that which Amalek did to us on the road as we left Mitzraim. If one does not remember he will have transgressed a lo sassay. The Sifri in parshas Ki Saitzai says that the way in which one is to remember is by reading the parsha in the Torah that discusses Amalek's attack and the commandment to remember and annihilate Amalek found at the end of parshas Ki Saitzai. The Gemara in Migilla 30a says that we should read parshas zachor prior to Purim in order that the remembrance of what Amalek did should be adjacent to the reading of the annihilation of Amalek.

The Sefer Hachinuch states in mitzvah 603, that women are exempt from the mitzvah of remembering that which Amalek did to us. He explains that this is because it is not upon women to wage war and avenge the enemy, therefore they are exempt from remembering that which Amalek did to us. It is evident that the Chinuch is of the opinion that the mitzvah of remembering that which Amalek did to us is a prerequisite to the mitzvah of annihilating Amalek, therefore the fact that women are not obligated in the war against Amalek is reason to exempt them from the mitzvah of remembering that which Amalek did to us.

The Minchas Chinuch asks several questions on the ruling of the Chinuch. One question that he asks is that the Gemara in Sota 44b says that everyone must go out to war for a milchemes mitzvah even a kallah from her chuppa. Additionally one can ask, that the Chinuch himself writes in mitzvah 425 regarding the mitzvah to kill the seven nations that even women are obligated. Evidently, women are obligated in waging war and thus even according to the Chinuch's logic (that the two mitzvos are connected) they should be obligated in the mitzvah of remembering that which Amalek did to us.

My Rebby, Reb Shmuel Berenbaum zt"l, suggested that we can differentiate between the mitzvah to annihilate Amalek and the other mitzvos. The words of the Chinuch are indicative that in his opinion the mitzvah of annihilating Amalek is in essence to take revenge. As the Chinuch says "for it is upon men to wage war and avenge the enemy and not women."  Regarding the mitzvah to destroy the seven nations the Chinuch writes that "the seven nations started worshiping all sorts of idols… therefore we are commanded to destroy them… by performing this mitzvah and succeeding to annihilate them we will have benefited for we will no longer be able to learn from their ways". The source for this is the passuk that says regarding the obligation to kill the seven nations "So that they will not teach you to act according to all of their abominations that they performed for their gods (Divarim 20:18)."

The essence of the mitzvah of annihilating the seven nations is to rid the word of evil and bad influences. The essence of the mitzvah to annihilate Amalek is to avenge them.  Women are obligated to go to war however when the essence of the war is to avenge, they are exempt. As the Chinuch says it is upon the men to avenge and not the women. Therefore for a milchemes mitzvah or to kill the seven nations women are obligated. They are only exempt from the milchama against Amalek since it is a war whose purpose is to take revenge.

Reb Shmuel added that there is a possible nafka mina (difference) between the two mitzvos. If there is one who is about to die on his own, is there an obligated to kill him. If he is an Amaleki then we would still be obligated to kill him to take revenge. If he is of the seven nations where the purpose of the mitzvah is to rid the world of the evil influences then perhaps there would not be an obligation to kill him since he is going to die and not influence either way.

I want to suggest another answer to the Minchas Chinuch's questions on the Chinuch. The Radvaz, in his commentary to the Rambam (hilchos milachim 7:4) where the Rambam writes that for a milchemes mitzvah even a kallah from her chuppa must go to war, asks "is it the derech for women to go to war? Does the passuk not say the glory of a woman is inside (Tihilim 45)?" the Radvaz answers that perhaps the role that the women assumed in the war was to bring provisions to their husbands.

Based on this we can explain that although women are an integral part of the war they do not partake in the actual killing of the enemy. As previously mentioned the Chinuch is of the opinion that the mitzvah of remembering that which Amalek did to us is a prerequisite to the mitzvah of annihilating Amalek, as the Rambam (hilchos milachim 5:5, and sefer hamitzvos mitzvas assay 189) explains that one should bring himself to remember that which Amalek did to us in order that he is in the mindset to wage war. We can suggest that only one who is obligated to partake in the actual killing of Amalek is obligated to remember that which Amalek did to us. Therefore women are exempt since they do not partake in the actual killing ofAmalek.

There are several achronim that paskin that women are obligated to hear parshas zachor, and one should consult a Rav regarding halacha limaisa.

For comments email : RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com



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Posted By KH to KollelH blog at 3/01/2012 11:41:00 PM